Court Uses ‘Common Sense’ Interpretation of What Constitutes an “Employment Benefit”

Posted by Edward Marc Fishman

On a normal duty day in September 1998, Deputy Kip Ringen (of the Lake County Sheriff’s Department) was on-duty, driving his patrol vehicle. Traveling on a two-lane highway, he found himself behind a long, slow-moving line of traffic. In an effort to pass this string of cars, Ringen moved toward the next car in line. Immediately, traffic slowed, and he found himself braking as the distance between the vehicles shortened.

At that same moment, a patrol sergeant who happened to be traveling in the opposite direction observed the short distance between Ringen’s vehicle and the one immediately in front of him. The sergeant contacted Ringen by radio and asked him why he was driving in that manner. In response, Ringen stated, among other things: “I have been trying to pass this string of cars since Bottle Rock Road.”

This statement soon became the subject of a subsequent internal affairs investigation, which called into question Ringen’s honesty.

Apparently, as Ringen was explaining the circumstances to his sergeant, those same radio communications were being monitored by another sergeant who happened to observe Ringen while he passed Bottle Rock Road. Upon hearing Ringen’s explanation, this second sergeant immediately exclaimed to the deputy riding shotgun with him: “He’s lying.”

The second sergeant then informed the first of the perceived discrepancy, and, following a meeting between the two sergeants; Ringen was formally accused of untruthfulness, in addition to the driving offense. Ringen, president of the deputies’ Association, director of the Redwood Chapter of PORAC, and a long-time vocal advocate of the rights of his fellow deputies voiced extreme objection to the allegation of untruthfulness.

Dennis Wright, a non-attorney labor representative, was engaged by the Legal Defense Fund to protect Ringen’s interests in the related internal affairs investigation. At the resulting internal affairs interview, when asked to explain the factual discrepancy between Ringen’s and the second sergeant’s observation, Ringen graphically described his belief that the second sergeant was the one not being truthful. Quickly, Ringen was issued a letter of reprimand concerning those statements. Wright was soon able to have that letter rescinded, due to its impropriety.

Eventually, the sheriff meted out the following punishment for the driving/untruthfulness incident: a 20-hour suspension and loss of the associated benefits. Additionally, the sheriff stripped Ringen of his permanently assigned patrol vehicle, which Ringen regularly drove between his home and duty station.

Following an unsuccessful Skelly hearing, the proposed discipline was imposed. Wright, anticipating the potential for ensuing legal action due to the tenor of the allegations, contacted me to aid in the appeal process. LDF agreed to provide attorney services for the appeal.

With Wright’s assistance, I pursued the appeal in an advisory arbitration forum. During the hearing, there was an extensive exploration into not only the veracity of the subject officer but also as to the charging witnesses. While testifying, the deputy who was riding shotgun with the second sergeant was unable to fully corroborate the second sergeant’s observations. I then directed my cross-examination toward the two sergeants’ markedly differing descriptions of their meeting to discuss Ringen’s alleged untruthfulness.

The arbitrator, Joe Henderson, carefully listened to the testimony, and in his decision concluded that the imposed discipline was unwarranted, because the department failed to prove to his satisfaction that Ringen was the one being untruthful.

Of significance, the arbitrator recommended the following remedy:

Ringen was to be reimbursed for any compensation he lost for the 20-hour suspension;

All documents related to the matter were to be removed from his personnel file; and,

Ringen was to have “all leave and any other benefits restored to him if any were lost due to this action”.

The board of supervisors later adopted this recommendation in full, and the deputy was reimbursed for the loss in pay, had his patrol vehicle returned to him, and presumably, all documents related to the matter were removed from his file.

Ringen then calculated the cost to him during the time he was deprived of the patrol vehicle. As to this amount, he requested reimbursement.

The department and the county vehemently argued that the use of the patrol vehicle was neither compensation nor a benefit to be restored. They claimed that the sheriff’s allowance to each deputy of a permanently assigned take-home patrol vehicle could have been withdrawn at any time, thus there was no entitlement to its continued use.

Wright asked that the matter be calendared for hearing before the board of supervisors for clarification. At the resulting hearing, the sheriff and county council argued against Ringen’s requested restoration of benefits. The board quickly and unanimously agreed with the sheriff’s position.

LDF, recognizing the importance of this issue, authorized an appeal to the Superior Court to determine the propriety of the county’s decision. Accordingly, a petition for writ of mandate was filed.

While the matter was pending, deputy county counsel and I explored the prospects of compromise. I suggested that the county offer Ringen the amount claimed, but to avoid their fear of “setting a precedent”, we would construe the payment as something other than mileage expense reimbursement. Although this compromise was acceptable to Ringen and was supported by the sheriff, surprisingly the board of supervisors refused to compromise in any manner. Accordingly, the writ was fully pursued.

After full legal briefing and oral argument, the court recognized that the case was one of the first impression, and thus no guiding statute or case law was of assistance. Instead, the court explained the need to take a “common sense” approach. A benefit by its own terms necessarily imposes a burden on one party and provides an advantage to another.

Ringen’s use of the vehicle did burden the county by the resulting costs of gasoline, maintenance, etc. The advantage to him was obvious. Additionally, the court recognized that the vehicle was taken away not for an independent non-disciplinary reason, but instead as a direct result of the unfounded charging allegations. Finally, the court interpreted the spirit and intent of the arbitrator’s ruling to make Ringen whole, so that he suffered no loss from the county’s unwarranted disciplinary action.

Thus, the court granted the petition, found the amount Ringen claimed for reimbursement to be reasonable, and ordered the county to pay him that amount, in addition to Ringen’s attorney’s fees.

The final decision rendered by the court this past December marks the end of a more than a two-year struggle over a highly questionable disciplinary action taken against an 18-year veteran deputy sheriff.