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By PORAC | November 1, 2001 | Posted in PORAC LDF News

Yuba County Sheriff’s Deputy Reinstated with Back Pay Benefits and Interest

Yuba County Sheriff’s Deputy Sharon Sager has been reinstated as a deputy sheriff with full back pay, benefits and interest by order of the Yuba County Superior Court. The decision was rendered after the Yuba County Sheriff’s Department separated Sager from her employment, alleging she had resigned.

Sager has been a sheriff’s deputy in Yuba County for more than 20 years. On November 8, 2000, Sager was working patrol. Her sergeant called in sick. The past practice at the department was to assign the senior deputy on shift as the temporary supervisor. Sager was the senior deputy on shift. However, rather than assign Sager as temporary supervisor, the department called in a male deputy many years her junior to fill in as supervisor.

This was not the first time the department had passed over Sager to fill a temporary supervisor assignment. Sager had been passed over on numerous occasions with the department using the excuse that it was merely an oversight. Sager contacted her lieutenant in an effort to obtain an explanation. The lieutenant refused to explain why the decision had been made and told Sager that she had limitations. Sager had never been told she had limitations and suspected that the decision was made because she is female. Sager contacted her captain for an explanation. He refused to talk to her and said to put her questions in writing.

Sager returned to the sheriff’s department and turned her identification card and firearm over to the captain. She again asked him to explain what limitations she had. The captain asked her for her key to the back door.

Sager then met with Sheriff Virginia Black and explained to her what was going on. The sheriff told Sager that she did not have any limitations. The sheriff asked Sager if she wanted to quit. Sager said “no”. The sheriff then stated that Sager still had a job. Sager was authorized to take the rest of the day off and to call the department in the morning. Sager’s husband contacted the sheriff later that day and was assured by the sheriff that Sager still had a job. On November 9, 2000, Sager called the department as directed and was informed that the department had accepted her resignation. The department never attempted to obtain a resignation in writing.

On December 4, 2000, Sager contacted LDF panel attorney Steven W. Welty with the Law Firm of Mastagni, Holstedt, Chiurazzi & Amick. The county was placed on notice by Welty that Sager had not resigned. A request was made for a disciplinary appeal based on an involuntary separation from employment. The county refused to provide Sager with an administrative appeal alleging that her resignation had been accepted and the action did not constitute discipline.

On March 27, 2001, Welty filed a Writ of Mandate in the Yuba County Superior Court seeking to compel the county to reinstate Sager with back pay and benefits. A Motion for Peremptory Disqualification was also filed asking that the case be reassigned to a different judge. All the judges in Yuba County recused themselves. Nevada County Superior Court Judge Kathleen Butz was brought in to hear the case.

The law governing resignation is contractual. There has to be a valid offer and acceptance of the offer. The legal arguments in the Writ of Mandate were threefold. First, Sager’s actions on November 8, 2000, were not sufficiently definite to constitute an offer of resignation. Second, even if an offer of resignation was made, it was rescinded before the county accepted it. Third, even if an offer of resignation was made and accepted, the offer was invalid because it had been coerced. A hearing on the matter occurred on July 9, 2001.

The attorneys presented argument and testimony was presented in the form of declarations. On July 20, 2001, the Yuba County Superior Court issued it’s decision. The court found that Sager did offer to resign. However, her subsequent actions constituted a withdrawal of the offer such that the county had no resignation before it that could be accepted. Sager was reinstated to her former status effective November 9, 2000, the day she allegedly resigned.

It should be noted that the versions of what occurred on November, 8, 2000, differed greatly between the account of Sager and the account of the department. However, courts are reluctant to uphold a resignation when there is ambivalence concerning the resignation. Doubtful cases will be decided against resignation. In this case the county never even attempted to get the “phantom resignation” in writing.

The absence of documentary proof, coupled with the testimony of Sager and her husband, created significant doubt in the mind of the court as to what had occurred. In addition, Welty was able to effectively argue weaknesses in the county’s position. For example, the sheriff admitted she told Sager’s husband that Sager still had a job. The sheriff then attempted to explain that what she was saying was that Sager still had a job while the county decided whether to accept her resignation. Such testimony was not convincing.

The absence of a writing in a disputed case such as this adds substantial weight to the testimony of Sager. Courts clearly recognize the potential for abuse that would be present if employers could effectively separate “for cause” employees from their job merely by saying the employee resigned. Obtaining a written resignation from an employee is not a difficult task if the employee actually intends to resign.

While there is no legal requirement that a resignation be in writing, an employer failing to obtain one does so at their own risk. If the department really believed that Sager wanted to resign, they should have obtained it in writing so that the intent of all parties would be clear. Such action would have also provided Sager with the opportunity to express that she was not resigning or had decided to rescind the offer.

In addition to obtaining reinstatement with back pay and benefits for Sager, Welty requested an award of attorney fees and costs. The court awarded attorney fees and costs in this action in a stipulated amount of $7,000.00. This money is forwarded to LDF in a continuing effort to keep your legal defense coverage affordable.