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By PORAC | April 1, 2003 | Posted in PORAC LDF News

Superior Court Orders Reinstatement of Sac Pd Officer

Posted by Kasey Christopher Clark David E. Mastagni

The alleged bases of Farnsworth’s termination were a failure to properly report an on-duty vehicle accident, commingling of evidence, permitting an informant to drive without a license, alleged insubordination in Internal Affairs (IA), and dishonesty in the preparation of a number of search warrants. On or about May 15, 2001, the city of Sacramento Civil Service Board adopted a proposed decision, which upheld Farnsworth’s termination despite eliminating all charges except that involving search warrant preparation.

Farnsworth sought Superior Court review of the administrative decision by way of a petition for writ of mandate. Though the city of Sacramento ultimately conceded the allegations unrelated to the search warrants were no longer in dispute, Farnsworth argued the bogus nature of the charges were demonstrative of a malicious intent to separate him from employment at all costs. As an example, a photograph in the possession of the police department at the time of the internal investigation depicted an officer, who suffered minor injuries, next to the accident investigator. Nonetheless, when the investigator prepared a report, which failed to identify the injured officer, the department claimed the omission was Farnsworth’s responsibility.

The department likewise failed to provide Farnsworth all materials upon which the disciplinary action was based prior to his termination. Farnsworth was able to obtain a copy of a “red file” (informant file) and internal investigation summaries in the midst of the administrative hearing. However, the hearing officer concluded he was not entitled to the opinions and analysis (“o’s & a’s”) of the IA case or the recommendations of his chain of command as to the propriety of discipline and level of punishment.

In anticipation of Superior Court review, Farnsworth was able to obtain the o’s & a’s and recommendations by relying on the case of Wyley v. The city of Sacramento, which was decided after Farnsworth’s administrative hearing. Wyley held that Government Code § 3306.5 legally obligated the Sacramento PD to disclose all documents that were used in conjunction with discipline.

The o’s & a’s and recommendations revealed police managers were equivocal as to whether the investigation proved Farnsworth was dishonest in the preparation of the warrant affidavits in question. A deputy chief recommended Farnsworth be suspended and transferred from Narcotics, a recommendation apparently ignored by the chief of police.

Also, at the administrative hearing, the lead internal investigator testified he had exhausted every avenue in gathering evidence, which would prove or disprove Farnsworth’s guilt. The IA sergeant represented he had conducted a detailed search of all warrants written by Farnsworth during the time period 1995 through September 1998 and had located 40 warrants. Of these, the sergeant claimed nine were accompanied by affidavits, which specified a window period which contradicted the date of the actual narcotics informant’s buy. The department argued more than 20 percent of Farnsworth’s warrants were defective.

The hearing officer ruled two of the warrants in question were valid but concluded the seven remaining warrants were the product of dishonesty rather than carelessness or neglect. The administrative law judge upheld Farnsworth’s termination.

Subsequent to the administrative hearing, Farnsworth conducted his own review and was able to locate 68 total warrants, which markedly reduced the margin of error. Farnsworth also obtained a declaration from a supervising district attorney which stated the defective warrants would not have jeopardized the criminal prosecutions on which they were based.

At oral argument, Farnsworth’s attorney, Kasey Christopher Clark, argued that the additional evidence and o’s & a’s/recommendations mitigated against a finding of dishonesty. Clark also pointed out that two of the warrant affidavits specified a shortened window period, which was inconsistent with a dishonest motive.

In the Superior Court decision, Judge Jones declined to admit as evidence the after-acquired warrants obtained by Farnsworth and the declaration of the supervising DA. The court did allow in the material reviewed by the department in conjunction with the imposition of discipline. In ruling on the warrant affidavits, the court stated:

“The court is not persuaded that the nature of the discrepancies indicates dishonesty. Significantly, it appeared from the evidence that the discrepancies would not necessarily have invalidated the search warrants. The discrepancies were not major. In virtually all of the cases the date of the actual ‘buy’ was only one day outside the period stated on the affidavit. While this put those ‘buys’ outside the seven-day period that the department required as a matter of policy, the actual ‘buys’ were still within the period of time in which, under applicable constitutional standards, a search warrant could have been granted. Moreover, in some cases, the date of the actual ‘buy’ was within the department’s usual period of seven days, but the discrepancy occurred because [Farnsworth] erroneously stated a six-day ‘buy window’ in his affidavit. Furthermore, the evidence also demonstrated that a ‘buy’ that had become ‘stale’ under department policy could be ‘refreshed’ without any particular difficulty. Therefore, the court is not persuaded that [Farnsworth] had any motive to lie in the affidavits, or that there was any particular benefit to him for doing so.”

Based on this finding, the court ordered Farnsworth reinstated with back pay and benefits subject to any suspension the Civil Service Board might impose on remand, taking into account Farnsworth’s reputation for honesty and integrity and the fact he had no prior history of the discipline.

Rather than accept the court’s decision, the city of Sacramento has appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal. Although it is our belief the appeal does not automatically stay the implementation of Judge Jones’ decision, the city refuses to comply with the judgment and continues to deprive Farnsworth not only of his former position but, more importantly, his salary. To alleviate any financial hardship, Mastagni, Holstedt & Amick is seeking to enforce the judgment during the pendency of the appeal.