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By PORAC | April 1, 2002 | Posted in PORAC LDF News

Appellate Court Rules that Government Code Section 3307 Does Not Apply to Results of Voluntary Lie Detector Tests

Posted by Alison Berry Wilkinson

Almost immediately, a question was raised concerning whether this new language only prohibited evidence about forced lie detector tests, or whether it broadly prohibited all lie detector evidence in administrative hearings – even where the peace officer voluntarily subjected his or herself to the test, regardless of whether the officer received a favorable or unfavorable result.
Recognizing that the ambiguity in the 3307 language could significantly alter the evidence in a pending disciplinary case, the PORAC Legal Defense Fund authorized this author to take this important issue before the Contra Costa County Superior Court and, ultimately, to the First District Court of Appeal.

The case was hotly contested and extensively briefed by both parties because of the unique and unusual fact situation where the results of a voluntary lie detector examination were directly at issue. Ultimately, in the unpublished decision issued in Yates v. County of Contra Costa, the appeals court, after thoroughly analyzing the statute’s legislative history, held that “an officer who has volunteered to take a lie detector exam is not ‘subjected to’ the test within the meaning of section 3307″ and that “the statute does not mandate exclusion of the lie detector results . . . when an officer without any hint of coercion, voluntarily decides to take the polygraph test.”

Although the court did not establish an automatic exclusionary rule for lie detector evidence, it still noted that “whether the lie detector test is reliable, whether the results are admissible and, if so, what weight should be given to that evidence” remains for the arbitrator to determine. The court went on to state that, “The arbitrator has the discretion to rule on all issues involving the lie detector test. We hold only that section 3307 does not preemptively preclude the use of the results of a voluntary lie detector….”

In coming to that result, the court emphasized that, in general, the results of polygraph examinations are not admissible in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings. (See, e.g., Evidence Code section 351.1; Aengst v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 110 Cal. App. 3d 275, 282-284 [polygraph not admissible in administrative hearing]; Robinson v. Wilson 44 Cal. App. 3d 92, 103 [admissible in civil case only by stipulation of parties]; Gideon v. Gideon, 153 Cal. App. 2d 541, 546 [“Lie detector tests have no place in California law”]; and Labor Code section 432.2(a).) Thus, the parties were allowed to argue directly to the arbitrator whether the polygraph evidence was admissible and/or persuasive.

Once again, the PORAC Legal Defense Fund extended coverage to fight a court battle to protect and define important rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, Government Code section 3300 et seq. With the combined efforts of the LDF and Rains, Lucia & Wilkinson, even though unpublished, this decision will assist other peace officers as they plan their defense against disciplinary actions that involve lie detector evidence.

About the Author: Alison Berry Wilkinson is the managing partner of Rains, Lucia & Wilkinson LLP, a law firm emphasizing the representation of peace officers in criminal, civil and administrative proceedings, as well as peace officer labor organizations in collective bargaining and other labor relations matters. Alison has extensive experience defending complex disciplinary cases and handling litigation involving all aspects of peace officer employment.