‘Great Bodily Injury’ Under PC § 832.7: Navigating the Disclosure Debate in California’s Superior Courts, Part 1

DAVID E. MASTAGNI
Partner
Mastagni Holstedt, APC

In the wake of Senate Bill 1421, enacted in 2018, which amended Penal Code section 832.7 to mandate the disclosure of certain peace officer personnel records, California law enforcement agencies and officers have grappled with the scope of these new transparency requirements. At the heart of the most significant ongoing controversy is the interpretation of “great bodily injury” (GBI) as used in section 832.7(b)(1)(A)(ii), which requires the release of records relating to incidents where an officer’s use of force resulted in death or GBI. Although the statute does not define GBI, courts and agencies have drawn upon analogous provisions in the Penal Code, leading to a split in interpretations between broad and narrow views. This article examines the arguments for both approaches, reviews relevant court rulings to date and provides practical guidance for PORAC members advocating for a narrower construction that safeguards confidentiality interests while complying with the law.

SB 1421 significantly shifted California’s approach to police accountability, carving out exceptions to the longstanding confidentiality protections afforded to peace officer personnel records under Penal Code section 832.7(a). Prior to this amendment, such records were generally shielded from public disclosure, subject only to limited access through judicial processes like those outlined in Evidence Code section 1043, et seq. (i.e., the Pitchess statutes). Now, in response to a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request, agencies must disclose records pertaining to specified categories, including use-of-force incidents resulting in death or GBI, discharges of firearms at persons, sustained findings of sexual assault and sustained findings of dishonesty.

The absence of an explicit definition for GBI in section 832.7 has invited divergent interpretations. Some superior courts have applied a broad construction that could encompass a wide array of common and relatively minor injuries, while recent California Supreme Court guidance suggests a more restrictive view where GBI involves injuries more severe than those defined as “serious bodily injury” (SBI). This tension is evident in ongoing litigation, such as the First Amendment Coalition’s lawsuit against the City of San Diego. Filed on June 25, 2025, First Amendment Coalition v. City of San Diego seeks disclosure of records related to a March 2025 arrest, where officers deployed a beanbag shotgun and a police K-9, allegedly causing injuries that the First Amendment Coalition argues qualify as GBI. The question of whether an injury constitutes GBI most frequently arises in criminal trials, during which juries must decide where to draw the line, on a case-by-case basis. That imprecise standard presents serious complications for a records disclosure requirement that should be clearly delineated and uniformly applied, but will likely require clarification from the courts or the Legislature.

Arguments in Favor of a Broad Interpretation of GBI

Advocates for a broad interpretation of GBI often rely on Penal Code section 12022.7(f), which defines the term as “a significant or substantial physical injury.” This definition, drawn from sentencing enhancement provisions, has been construed by appellate courts to include injuries that are neither trivial nor insignificant, but need not rise to the level of life-threatening harm. For instance, in People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal. 4th 58, the California Supreme Court clarified that GBI under section 12022.7 exceeds “moderate harm” or “trivial or insignificant injury,” but encompasses conditions such as lacerations, bruises, abrasions, contusions, burns, punctures and physical pain. “The injury need not be so grave as to cause the victim permanent, prolonged, or protracted bodily damage” (Id. at p. 64 [internal quotations omitted]).

Similarly, Penal Code section 198.5, related to self-defense, states, “[a]s used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury,” and California Criminal Jury Instruction 3160 defines GBI as “significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.”

Some California courts have interpreted this definition broadly in finding certain injuries constituted GBI. (See People v. Washington [2012] 210 Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1047-1048 [some physical pain or damage, such as lacerations, bruises, or abrasions]; People v. Jung [1999] 71 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1042 [same]; People v. Wallace [1993] 14 Cal. App. 4th 651, 665-666 [cuts and burns from being flex-cuffed, and a burning sensation from an insecticide-like substance]; People v. Bustos [1994] 23 Cal. App. 4th 1747, 1755 [multiple abrasions, lacerations, and contusions]; People v. Corona [1989] 213 Cal. App. 3d 589 [a swollen jaw, bruises to head and neck, and sore ribs]; People v. Sanchez [1982] 131 Cal. App. 3d 718 [multiple abrasions and lacerations to back and bruising of eye and cheek]; and People v. Jaramillo [1979] 98 Cal. App. 3d 830, 836-837 [multiple contusions, swelling and discoloration of the body, and extensive bruises].)

A definition so expansive as to include injuries such as bruises and abrasions potentially captures many routine use-of-force encounters. Proponents of this broad conception, including organizations like the First Amendment Coalition, contend that this approach furthers the legislative intent behind SB 1421 to enhance public transparency and accountability, as mandated by Article I, section 3(b)(2) of the California Constitution, which requires statutes to be construed liberally in favor of disclosure (Police Transparency Handbook, the First Amendment Coalition [2023]). If adopted, this view could mandate disclosure of nearly all incidents involving any physical injury, thereby significantly increasing scrutiny of law enforcement practices.

Arguments in Favor of a Narrow Interpretation of GBI

In contrast, supporters of a narrow interpretation contend that GBI disclosures under section 832.7 require at least more than a “serious bodily injury” (SBI) as defined in Penal Code section 243(f)(4) and Government Code section 12525.2(d). Section 243(f)(4), related to the crime of battery, defines SBI as “serious impairment of physical condition” and provides a nonexhaustive list of examples, including loss of consciousness, concussion, bone fracture, protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ, wounds requiring extensive suturing and serious disfigurement. This definition explicitly excludes injuries requiring no medical treatment, reinforcing that trivial harms do not qualify. Government Code section 12525.2(d), related to mandatory law enforcement agency reports to the Department of Justice, similarly describes SBI as involving a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ.

Federal statutes do not define GBI but do provide definitions of SBI that are useful. Title 21 U.S. Code section 802(25), related to enforcement of controlled substance law, defines “serious bodily injury” as bodily injury that involves (1) a substantial risk of death; (2) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (3) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty. Title 18 U.S. Code section 1365(h)(3), describing punishments for tampering with consumer products, defines “serious bodily injury” similarly, as bodily injury that involves (1) a substantial risk of death; (2) extreme physical pain; (3) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (4) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty.

This narrower and heightened framework is consistent with SB 1421’s legislative history. Even the ACLU, an obvious advocate of broad disclosure, described that the purpose of the bill was to provide the public access to information about when an officer “shoots, kills, or seriously injures a member of the public” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1421 [2017–2018 Reg. Sess.] Apr. 17, 2018). (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, during its draft stages, the bill was amended to replace SBI with GBI. The official legislative history states that this change was to clarify the level of injury required, due to the larger body of law interpreting GBI and existing incident tracking already done by law enforcement (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1421 [2017–2018 Reg. Sess.] as amended Apr. 2, 2018). While unfortunately not reflected in the official legislative history, the California Police Chiefs Association requested the change to GBI with the specific intention of requiring a higher severity of injury than SBI.

Moreover, proponents of the narrower interpretation point to the excessive administrative burden that would result under the overly broad definition of GBI. Agencies would face significant challenges in identifying and compiling records given the volume of routine use-of-force incidents involving minor or moderate injuries (e.g., bruises, sprains or minor lacerations). For example, routine arrests or crowd-control scenarios often involve minor injuries, exponentially increasing the records pool and straining agency resources. This could overwhelm departments, especially considering requests may span multiple years, and the resource-intensive redaction process.

From a policy perspective, construing GBI to require an equivalent or more severe injury than SBI better balances transparency interests against the practical realities of law enforcement and the ability of agencies to respond to CPRA requests. This standard is administratively feasible as it is consistent with existing reporting obligations, and it provides more clarity on the standard for classification of use-of-force incidents.

Stay tuned for Part 2, the conclusion of this article, in the October issue of PORAC Law Enforcement News, where we discuss the current state of affairs, how courts have handled the issue so far and where we go from here.

About the Author

David Emilio Mastagni is a partner with the law firm of Mastagni Holstedt, APC, and an experienced panel attorney for the PORAC Legal Defense Fund. He also provides legal analysis and representation for PORAC at the California Legislature on bills affecting public safety employees, including Senate Bills 1421 and 16.